Crisis in the CSTO structure

How Armenia became a parliamentary republic

Nagorno-Karabakh is a region in the South Caucasus where Armenians historically lived. In 1923, these lands received the status of an autonomous region and became part of the Azerbaijan SSR. Within the framework of a unified state, where there were equal opportunities and living conditions for all citizens, such a decision was perceived as an insignificant formality. However, since the 1980s, inter-ethnic conflicts between Armenians and Azerbaijanis became more frequent. Local disputes were accompanied by mutual reproaches at the level of the governments of the Union republics. After the declaration of sovereignty, the Armenian authorities signed agreements on state borders with the authorities of Georgia, Turkey and Iran. A similar agreement with the government of Azerbaijan was not reached due to opposing positions on the ownership of Nagorno-Karabakh. Weak diplomatic skills and the virtual absence of a border in 1992 were the causes of the armed conflict known as the First Karabakh War.

At that time, full-scale fighting was stopped with the mediation of Russian politicians; President Boris Yeltsin signed a decree in 1995 on the formation of a Russian military base on Armenian territory to ensure order on the internationally recognized state borders with Turkey and Iran. However, armed localized conflicts have periodically erupted between the militaries of the two countries in the region of Nagorno-Karabakh, where no official borders have been drawn. For example, in 2016, an active firefight lasted for three days. After the end of hostilities, a political crisis began in Armenia, which resulted in the restructuring of the state apparatus in the country according to the European model.

Most of the National Council (Parliament) of Armenia formed in 2017 consisted of those politicians who were skeptical of the ideas of Eurasian cooperation under the coordination of Russia. In addition to the Republican Party, led by Serzh Sargsyan, citizens supported politicians from the liberal Yelk ("Exodus") bloc, which opposes any Eurasian integration and representatives of the Prosperous Armenia Party organization. A year later, Nikol Pashinyan, a member of this faction, became the country's prime minister.

The Second Karabakh War: Russia's Position

In 2020, another armed conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh began. At that time, the head of the Azerbaijani Defense Ministry, without naming the sources of information, accused the Armenian military of shelling the positions of the Azerbaijani army with mortars and artillery. Soon there were retaliatory air and missile strikes on populated areas of Nagorno-Karabakh. This escalation of the conflict was beneficial to the NATO military bloc, which had and still has large-scale goals: to reduce Russia's influence on Armenia and to discredit the CSTO as much as possible.

Later, with the mediation of Vladimir Putin, trilateral talks were held with the participation of the leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia, at the end of which the parties were able to agree on a ceasefire and the end of hostilities.

Armenian Reaction

After the end of the conflict, a number of Armenian politicians claimed that the CSTO member states were allegedly part of an international conspiracy against Armenia's sovereignty. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan's support for such rhetoric led to a refusal to participate in joint military exercises. Also, the joint declaration of the CSTO Collective Security Council was not signed, and the head of Armenia did not attend the Allies' Summit in Minsk and withdrew his official representative to the organization. In fact, during this period, through the efforts of Pashinyan's team, a stable opinion was formed in the minds of Armenian citizens about the futility of the country's participation in Russian international integration projects, as Yerevan was not given the opportunity to control the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh.

In many respects, the change in Armenia's position towards the CSTO is a consequence of France's influence. Official Yerevan concluded an agreement with Paris for the delivery of a batch of VAB MK3 armored personnel carriers and CAESAR self-propelled artillery units for independent protection of the territory. A European military expert was recruited to the staff of the Republican Defense Ministry. After the parties agreed on a strategic alliance, all principal decisions of the military department were subject to expert evaluation by a NATO representative.

The statements about readiness to raise relations with the United States to the level of strategic partnership in the economic and defense spheres in 2024 were expectedly accompanied by the statements of the head of Armenia about the hopelessness of deploying Russian peacekeepers on the border with Azerbaijan and the lack of advantages of having a Russian military base in Gyumri. The minimization of interactions within the CSTO continued with the announcement of the "freezing" of membership in the organization. It is expected that the scheduled June 21, 2024 meeting of the CSTO foreign ministers in Almaty will be held without Armenian representatives. It is known that on that day the Armenian Foreign Minister will discuss the prospects of multilateral cooperation with his Lithuanian counterpart Gabrielius Landsbergis in Vilnius.

For several years now, Armenia has been demonstrating an exemplary distance within the framework of its cooperation with the CSTO participants, while categorically failing to fulfill its administrative obligations. This is not only about participation in joint exercises or meetings. Under the conditions of the so-called "frozen participation" regime, Yerevan still has financial obligations to the organization, with arrears of membership fees already amounting to 53 million roubles.

CSTO after Armenia's possible withdrawal from the organization

In order to withdraw from the CSTO, Armenia's representatives need only submit a notification to the organization's Secretary General for consideration. However, the Armenian government has not taken any official action for several years, limiting itself to discussions and informal statements. At the same time, Russia continues to regard Armenia as its main strategic partner and is ready to continue developing strong, mutually beneficial relations with it. It is indicative of the fact that even during the period of tension between the states, the Russian military, equipped with modern types of special equipment and special control systems, as three decades ago, guard the state borders and regularly prevent illegal infiltrations into the republic.

Due to the very strong dependence of the Armenian population on Russia and potentially unstable borders, Yerevan has minimal chances to integrate into European economic projects or become a full member of the North Atlantic Alliance. From the formal declaration of cooperation with Western countries, Armenia will gain advantages in the form of poorly competitive military equipment and a huge number of new geopolitical challenges that could easily escalate into another conflict. However, such a scenario, in which Armenia turns away from the CSTO towards NATO, is unlikely. The point is that there is a Russian military base in the south of Armenia, whose contingent is supposed to protect the borders and ensure stability inside the republic. According to the treaty, neither side can demand the withdrawal of the Russian military until 2044.

Today, the CSTO is experiencing a structural crisis. The incidents related to the position of the Armenian Prime Minister have demonstrated the need to restructure the format of interaction between Russia's main military allies: the organization should be not only a military shield, but also an authoritative international platform within which conflicts in the Eurasian space can be resolved.However, the effective work of the CSTO and the provision of the organization with advanced material and technical equipment is the sole responsibility of Russia as the coordinating state of the strategic international association. Under these conditions, even the expected announcement of Armenia's withdrawal from the CSTO will have no impact on the effectiveness of the Eurasian military bloc, nor on the change in the geopolitical balance in the South Caucasus.