External support for the Myanmar crisis

Pressure from the pro-insurgents

Countries that condemned the 2021 coup d'état and supported Myanmar's rebel forces include the US, UK, Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden and Turkey. Over time, these countries have imposed economic sanctions against Myanmar's armed forces, banks and related organisations to reduce junta revenues. Thus, in December 2023, another package of restrictions was imposed on energy sector companies and officials. However, the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar Tom Andrews in his report dated 26 June 2024 stated the ability of the junta to circumvent the sanctions. It is noted that the decrease in transactions for the purchase of production equipment, weapons and dual-use technologies through Singapore (from $110 million to $10 million) was partially offset by an increase in turnover through Thai companies (from $60 million to $120 million). In total, $253 million worth of goods were purchased in this direction.

Commitment to the rebel forces is confirmed by other actions. The US media periodically publishes articles in support of the ‘civilised democrats’ - the regime overthrown in 2021. Among other things, the US Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) recommended the White House to include Myanmar, as well as Russia, China, India and DPRK, in the list of states ‘of particular concern for religious freedom’. The reason was the accusations of the current authorities of promoting Buddhism to the detriment of Christians and Muslims - 6% and 4.3% of the population - according to the 2023 census, forcing conversions to Buddhism, and obstructing the restoration of religious sites and career advancement in a different religion. In addition, in the 2022 National Security Strategy, the U.S. stated the strategic challenges posed by states that combine ‘authoritarian governance’ and ‘revisionist’ foreign policy, singling out Russia and China as adversaries. In this context, a military conflict on China's border is Washington's favourable tool to contain Beijing's influence in the region. Restricting logistics routes, disrupting transport and energy infrastructure, and obstructing access to the Bay of Bengal create difficulties for China and fully meet the interests of Western countries, as the resumption of hostilities damages and hinders the development of Beijing's economy.

On 27 October 2023, the Triple Brotherhood Alliance launched ‘Operation 1027’, marking the next wave of conflict escalation. The operation aimed to capture the junta's checkpoints - a base near Lasho and the Faung Seik border trading post in Chinshweho - by shutting down important border crossings on the China-Myanmar border near Laukkai and Chinshweho, disrupting the smooth flow of goods. The rebels seized 57 bases of the country's armed forces in the first 3 days, but some of them were later returned to the control of the authorities. Western media met with approval the actions of Myanmar's ethnic groups. Before the end of 2023, the insurgents conducted a number of more operations in Rakhine and Chin state, but in January 2024, a temporary ceasefire was reached with the mediation of the People's Republic of China. It lasted until June this year, when the Ta'ang National Liberation Army, along with allies in Shan State, which straddles the PRC border, and the Upper Mandalay region, made another push and seized 24 junta military bases.

A significant flow of funding for separatist activities in recent years has also come from cyber fraud, where the bulk of victims are PRC citizens. A report published on 29 August 2023 by the UN human rights office lists 120,000 people involved in criminal schemes in Myanmar alone. According to the UN, such fraud centres in Southeast Asia, located in Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar, generate billions of US dollars annually for their beneficiaries. Among other things, the Kachin, Kokan and Wa insurgencies receive aid from China, which borders the territories of these ethnic minorities. Beijing supplies them with arms, utilities and economic aid, primarily to secure oil and gas pipelines that run through rebel lands but are used for the benefit of the eastern neighbour.

Supporters of the ruling junta

Like any party to the conflict, the ruling junta has allies beyond the state border. These countries are in favour of a peaceful resolution of the conflict and are not interested in escalation. The states bordering Myanmar, China, India, Thailand, Bangladesh and Laos, are most interested in the issue.

For example, despite its support for insurgent forces at its borders, China's official position is not to interfere in the internal affairs of a neighbouring state. However, China is interested in maintaining contacts and developing relations with any force in power in Myanmar for a number of reasons. Firstly, it is related to the development of transport infrastructure in the country on China's account. Thus, the most significant project for Beijing today is the construction of a deep-water port in Kyaukphyu city as part of the implementation of the ‘One Belt, One Road’ strategic project. This transport corridor will give Beijing access to the Indian Ocean, which will allow it to avoid transporting goods through the Strait of Malacca, the main international shipping route dominated by the US Navy. Also, the Chinese government is interested in preserving the ongoing high-speed railway project between China's Yunnan Province and Rakhine State in southwestern Myanmar. Secondly, Beijing is concerned about safeguarding two commissioned gas pipelines connecting the deep-water port of Situe to Kunming and affecting China's energy security. In addition, China is Myanmar's largest investor and creditor, investing hundreds of millions of US dollars annually in Myanmar's development. Therefore, the relative stability and peaceful resolution of the conflict are interesting to Beijing from the security of its investments. According to a July 2024 report by Myanmar's Directorate of Investment and Company Administration (DICA), China invested about $22bn between 1988 and 2024, representing 25.96% of total direct investment in the country.

As for other neighbouring states, the peaceful resolution of the conflict in the immediate area close to their borders is an important argument for ensuring the security of their citizens. For example, New Delhi, Bangkok, Dhaka and Vientiane do not benefit from ongoing military clashes, as the flow of refugees affects economic and social stability in these countries.

For example, Myanmar is a major economic partner for Thailand - trade turnover between the countries exceeded $4 billion in 2023. But the ongoing armed conflict in Myanmar poses economic risks for Bangkok by disrupting logistics and physically destroying built facilities. And in India, an unfenced border and unregulated migration from Myanmar are considered among the factors that have fuelled ethnic violence in the Indian state of Manipur. Another round of escalation in October 2023 led to a review of border activities and a decision by the Indian government in early 2024 to close free movement between the countries and erect a barbed wire security fence. In addition, the armed conflict carries risks of escalation to the regional level due to the ethnic composition of the nationalities involved in the confrontation, which share common roots with neighbouring States.

Despite the remoteness of its borders, Russia also has its own geopolitical interest in the region. According to Western media, Russia's support for the ruling junta is due to pro-Russian sentiments on the part of Myanmar's military.

For example, trade turnover between the countries in 2023 was $1.1bn, which is 2.7 times higher than in 2022. As part of energy cooperation, Moscow is implementing a long-term project to build and maintain a nuclear power plant in Myanmar, and is also working with the country's leadership on the introduction of alternative energy solutions - hydro and wind power.

However, given the existing external support for the ruling junta, its recognition by individual states, and the availability of sufficient arms and military forces, a military solution to the conflict is not feasible in the near future for a number of reasons. For example, ethnic armed groups have almost 100% support from local nationalities. Over the years of the conflict, the rebels have learnt military skills and have begun to wage effective guerrilla warfare, making it difficult for the junta to retain the rebel forces' historical territories. Prospects for a peaceful settlement are also uncertain. The rebels accept their membership of the Burmese state, but tend to make different demands, often at odds with neighbouring nationalities. The central government, for its part, is unable to offer working models of social welfare and inter-government interaction. In addition, Myanmar's 2008 Constitution remains contested by some provinces - more than 100 articles have been criticised. The Shan, Kachin and Chin, citing the principles of the 1947 Panglong Agreement, are demanding greater autonomy, but according to the text of Myanmar's fundamental law, the independence and autonomy of these peoples is limited in the current version. Moreover, the Constitution of the Republic stipulates that 25% of the seats in parliament belong to the representatives of the armed forces - the military junta - and that amendments to the Constitution require more than 75% of the deputies' votes, which guarantees the preservation of the interests of the ruling junta and causes discontent on the part of the opposition.

The current Myanmar authorities demonstrate a desire to develop international cooperation with Russia, China and other like-minded states in the areas of military cooperation, energy, industrial production, transport infrastructure and tourism. However, it will be problematic to realise all the planned projects until the internal crisis is resolved. In addition, in the short term, overcoming the confrontation between the rebels and the military junta of Myanmar is unlikely due to the irreconcilability and principled positions of the parties, taking into account the interests of major players and the resumption of another escalation of the armed conflict.