Future of the National Security Doctrine of Israel
Israel is one of the few advanced states in the world that has not published or updated its military strategic documents for more than 50 years. However, the events of October 7, 2023 showed the vulnerability of the country's current military concepts and changed Tel Aviv's position, forcing it to revise and adapt the relevant legislation to modern challenges and dynamically changing threats from neighboring states. Thus, in February 2025, the Israeli Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) published a new draft of Israel's National Security Doctrine and Policy Guidelines for 2025-2026. It is based on the officially recognized views of the country's military and political leadership on threats to national security, draft strategies, military doctrines and other acts that have been formulated and developed since the establishment of the Israeli state. Nevertheless, the issue of adopting the relevant document is still open: how quickly and to what extent Israel will be able to implement the new strategic principles depends largely on internal political discussions and the reaction of the international community. At the same time, the Doctrine is already setting a vector for the transformation of the country's defense policy, possibly for a later period, determining its further development in the face of growing threats and instability in the region.
Background to the establishment of Israel's National Security Doctrine
To date, there are no officially published security documents in Israel, as is the case, for example, in the main allied state since its creation - the United States. Nevertheless, the country's leadership and its military units, when making strategic decisions regarding Israel's domestic or foreign policy, are guided by well-established “unwritten” acts and strategies that were formulated more than half a century ago by the military and political elite of the Jewish state. Thus, the first foundational document in this area was Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion's report to the Cabinet in 1953, which included a comprehensive review of national security problems and their implications. It was in this report that Ben-Gurion articulated three fundamental levels of security for the state in the face of persistent regional threats - deterrence, early warning and decisive victory - which later formed the basis for the draft of Israel's National Security Doctrine and State Policy Guidelines 2025-2026, published by the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) in February 2025.
In the context of the Ben-Gurion Report, deterrence refers to making the enemy realize that it has little chance of achieving its objectives through direct military confrontation with Israel, as well as fearing substantial damage from imminent retaliation. Early warning, in turn, involves deploying military forces to prevent, thwart or neutralize a surprise attack by the enemy, while focusing on identifying the enemy's capabilities. And decisive victory, according to the document, means depriving an adversary of the capability to wage war, as well as the desire or ability to engage in war or other military confrontation.
There have been several other subsequent attempts by the Israeli government to develop a common defense doctrine. In 1998, Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai appointed Maj. Gen. (Res.) David Ivry - the future first national security adviser - to head a working group to update the state's defense and security concept. Ivri divided the working group into five subcommittees on issues related to military-civilian relations, military policy and public relations, strategic issues, technology, and Ben-Gurion's three security postulates. However, the final outcome could not be achieved due to the disparate views of the subcommittee members and the problems they identified. Then, in 2004, Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz initiated the creation of a new expert committee to develop an updated concept for Israel's defense and security, headed by Dan Meridor, one of the subcommittee leaders in the 1998 working group. The committee's tasks included analyzing changes and trends in the country's military-strategic field, examining the validity of the existing paradigm, and drafting a new national security doctrine, taking into account the main challenges and threats expected during the 2006-2016 period. Its work resulted in a classified written report to the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense, the Israeli Security Agency (ISA), the Mossad and other security agencies, which was approved by the highest levels of the Israeli State, but was never officially adopted. Although Meridor took into account the mistakes of the previous committee's work and formed a single working group consisting of 15 representatives from different structures and areas, the clash of budgetary, political and defense factors in their conclusions and the focus on the interests of the Department of Defense over other stakeholders served as an argument against the document's adoption. Nevertheless, some provisions of this report were implemented in the current legislation, namely the fourth component of national security - defense. This concept is based on social resilience and the ability of the Israeli state's military and civilian forces to absorb a strike even in the event of a surprise attack, given that the country is surrounded by hostile states and non-state actors, to recover quickly and move toward victory.
9 years later, IDF Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot presented a strategic document that analyzed threats to Israel's security, tactical and strategic response scenarios, and the army's interaction with the state's political leadership. Although this act was not official doctrine, it influenced key aspects of the country's defense strategy, including the emergence of the “Campaign Between Wars” concept.
“The Campaign Between Wars” (CBW) is the term for the IDF's approach to the preventive use of forces and assets in the period before war. CBW is characterized by the Israeli army's offensive approach, advancing into enemy territory; using small units for the sake of operational success and building the capacity of the entire army in anticipation of future war; deterring an enemy who is exposed to the IDF's operational capabilities; and attempting to operate “below the threshold of war.” All of these are designed to prevent the next armed conflict or to give Israel the upper hand should one break out.
During the same period of time, Israel's National Security Council (NSC) drafted an updated security concept under the leadership of Col. (Res.) Gur Layish. This document emphasized the distinction between state and emergency situations, which had received greater attention during the David Ben-Gurion era, as well as early warning, counterterrorism, and achieving decisive victory. In addition, Layish insisted on the need to pursue a strategy of maintaining “prolonged calm” despite periodic minor acts of aggression on the enemy side, while being prepared to act decisively in the event of a full-scale conflict. However, this document, too, was never approved for official publication.
Thus, in 2017, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu expressed his desire to develop his own national security strategy, which was presented to the Cabinet and other military and legislative bodies a year later. Although the text of this strategy is still classified, some provisions were revealed as part of his speeches at the National Security College graduation ceremony and at the Jerusalem Globes conference in December 2018. According to the document, Israel's security is based on four main pillars - military, economic, political and social strength - with the simultaneous use of which it is possible to confront major threats from hostile states or terrorist entities. This is why Netanyahu has placed great emphasis on a qualitative military advantage over potential adversaries, insisting on increased investment in intelligence, the air force and the development of advanced weaponry, especially in the fields of robotics, drones and other technologies that enable operations deep inside enemy territory. As Israel is surrounded by aggressive Middle Eastern states, the Prime Minister also prioritized the protection of the population and strategic infrastructure through advanced anti-missile, anti-tunnel systems and advanced barrier technology in relation to Hamas' underground tunnel network, which has been frequently used by Hamas during its operations since 2006. Among other things, Netanyahu emphasized the need for constant readiness for the “war between wars,” with a special focus on protecting the country from terrorist threats.
According to military experts, the 2018 strategy is the most relevant and close to current realities, but requires some refinements. For example, former Maj. Gen. and National Security Advisor Yaakov Amidror believes that diplomatic and other non-military measures will still not and cannot replace the need to build up Israel's military capabilities. The precarious position of its American counterparts in the Middle East increasingly confirms the fact that Israel must rely solely on its own resources and military units to defend its territory and Jewish population. Nevertheless, the country needs a single codified security act to provide the flexibility and courage to change course without losing sight of Israel's core values and long-term security interests.
National Security Doctrine 2025-2026
Contemporary Israel, experiencing the ongoing division in the Middle East, needs more than ever a strategic document enshrining the basic principles of security and defense. Against this background, the National Security Doctrine and Policy Guidelines for the State of Israel 2025-2026 proposed by the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) represents an attempt by experts to summarize the available experience and consolidate the strategic vision of the state in the short term, and to recommend to the country's authorities a policy that would meet Israel's long-term security interests, taking into account identified foreign policy threats and changing realities.
The paper is based on the basic premise that Israel is a nation-state of the Jewish people that aspires to be part of the liberal democratic world. The regional situation is characterized by instability, which requires Israel to respond. At the same time, the country's economy is based on international relations and is dependent on third countries, which cannot be ignored when building a long-term policy for the State.
As envisioned by the authors, the National Security Doctrine proposed by the INSS consists of three interrelated documents: 1) the National Security Doctrine itself, which enshrines the foundations of Israel's security and basic principles of policy; 2) the National Policy Guidelines, which are periodically changed and shaped based on emerging circumstances and the chosen political and ideological vector of the country's leadership; 3) the Directives, which ensure the implementation of the first two documents by the executive authorities (not considered within the framework of the proposed INSS project). Thus, these documents form the general legal system of Israel's national security, where the Doctrine enshrines the most general theoretical requirements, and the Guiding Principles and Directives ensure their practical implementation, taking into account the emerging realities.
The Doctrine's core document is based on four interrelated, universally recognized principles that form the value basis of Israel's national policy and guide the executive branch. The first principle, national defense, in peacetime is directly related to the national goal of preserving Jewish identity, including the Jewish people's historical connection to the Land of Israel and the right to self-determination, as well as democratic freedoms and the pursuit of peace. In wartime, Israel, as a country with a relatively small army, must proceed from the need to reduce wars. Since Israel is inferior to its neighbors in terms of population, it will have to fight a war against a numerically superior enemy for the foreseeable future, so only short and effective military operations will not work to exhaust the country's reserves. In addition, the small territory of the state deprives it of any strategic depth and makes its rear vulnerable. In this regard, to ensure its security, Israel will continue to be guided by the postulates formulated by the first Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion more than twenty years ago. However, the authors of the document add to this list another postulate - prevention, which implies close cooperation of all Israeli intelligence services, utilizing their extensive international ties to conduct operational and diplomatic activities to prevent the onset of aggression.
Another basic principle of Israel's national security is economic sustainability. Due to the fact that Israel is an arid region with few natural resources, its main capital remains human capital. As stated by INSS experts, the country's competitive advantage is high-tech manufacturing, which provides about half of its economic growth and accounts for more than half of its exports. At the same time, the term “island economy” continues to be applied to Israel - economic ties with the countries of the Middle East remain rather insignificant compared to imports from the U.S. and some European countries, which in the future carries risks of trade blockade. Thus, achieving diversified trade relations with neighboring countries is of strategic importance for Israel, as it can contribute to lowering the cost of living and strengthening economic sustainability.
Israel's economic resilience is inextricably linked to social stability, characterized by a united society built on mutual responsibility, ready and able to mobilize in an emergency to defend the State, counter threats and rebuild the country after the war. Social resilience can be achieved through equal access to basic resources, effective leadership, social solidarity and functioning public and social institutions that can provide the necessary support to the population in crisis situations.
The final basic principle of Israel's National Security Doctrine is its international status or diplomatic power. The state's principled position in the international arena is openness and willingness to dialog with any regional country or entity in order to establish peace. This principle not only strengthens Israel's diplomatic power, but also enhances security by narrowing the range of threats the state may face. At the same time, a special role is given to the Western bloc of countries, which, according to the authors of the Doctrine, has become Israel's key international asset, and the commitment to liberal democratic countries is “invaluable” because it helps in positioning Israel as a key ally for many countries on the world stage. The need to deepen ties with non-governmental organizations is also emphasized, as they have a significant impact on international decision-making and shape the global diplomatic landscape.
Based on the basic principles of Israel's National Security Doctrine, the drafters propose specific Guiding Principles to be taken into account in securing the state in 2025-2026, based on three levels of policy: global, regional (with a separate Palestinian issue), and domestic. At the global level, Israel is recommended to continue to support the Western bloc in a changing world order, strengthen ties with the U.S. through a defense pact, strengthen bipartisan support, and develop liberal democratic values to prevent diplomatic isolation. Also, Israel, “as the home of the Jewish people,” should support Jewish communities around the world, and those in turn, through the preservation of cultural and historical heritage, should strengthen the image of the Jewish state in their countries of residence. In the global arena, the document notes a number of countries that are allegedly opponents of the liberal democratic world, and therefore cannot be perceived by Israel as friendly. The developers include Iran, China, Russia and North Korea, while economic ties with China are given a special role - it is necessary to balance the interests of the national economy (Beijing is Israel's main importer) with U.S. sensitivity to Chinese investments in advanced Israeli technology.
The most extensive issue is the regional agenda, which outlines the range of countries that could pose a direct or indirect threat to Israel's security - Iran, Palestine, Syria, Turkey and Lebanon. Central to the relationship between the U.S., Iran and Israel remains the nuclear issue. Israel is encouraged to participate in the formation of any nuclear deal to freeze Tehran's nuclear progress, otherwise an Iranian breakout would require an immediate Israeli military response, possibly coordinated with Washington. In general, it is suggested that economic pressure and covert operations should continue in order to “further weaken the regime” in Iran. In this light, Iraq, where the Shiite majority predominates, serves as an important security buffer for Iran, thus the U.S. presence in Iraq is in Israel's interest and limits Iran's negative influence, which should be strongly supported by its government.
In relations with Lebanon, the authors of the Doctrine see the ultimate goal as honoring the 2024 ceasefire agreement and UN Security Council Resolution 1701, as well as concluding border agreements. As measures toward the goal, Israel should use the influence of the U.S. and Western allies to prevent Hezbollah's military build-up, enforce a strict international arms embargo, and control the Lebanese army buildup.
As for Syria, its future remains uncertain, which, on the one hand, brings general instability to the region and, on the other hand, is an advantage for Israel, as it reduces the role of Syria as a logistical hub for arms supplies to anti-Israeli countries led by Iran. The authors consider three possible scenarios for the development of events in Syria: stabilization of the internal situation with the establishment of diplomatic ties with the West; Islamic radicalization of the country with simultaneous opposition to the West and Israel; fragmentation of Syria into semi-autonomous regions with a weak center of power. The most dangerous scenario is the second one, which Israel should oppose while establishing a dialog with moderate Syrian political forces to prevent the spread of instability. At the same time, given Turkey's relationship with Syria's ruling line, as well as its global role in political Islam, Israel should keep an eye on Ankara as a potential threat, maintaining diplomatic relations and rejecting any anti-Turkish rhetoric.
The Palestinian track takes a special place in the draft Doctrine. According to its provisions, Israel must retain full security control of the Gaza Strip to prevent Hamas from regaining its capabilities, and partial annexation of Gaza's neighborhoods into Israel is allowed. Civil administration of Gaza must be transferred to a non-partisan neutral Palestinian entity supported regionally and internationally. Israel expects the active participation of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Jordan in the humanitarian mission in Gaza, and favors the establishment of an International Humanitarian Council with U.S. participation to consolidate humanitarian efforts. At the same time, Israel must unequivocally combat Palestinian terrorism in coordination with regional actors and the security forces of a reformed Palestinian organization.
In the domestic arena, in order to strengthen national cohesion, Israel must reduce inequality among the population by enacting laws on security burden-sharing and civil status, and maintain a balance between all branches of government without exacerbating social divisions. Moreover, given that not all of Israel's borders were internationally agreed and recognized, the draft Doctrine warned against annexing disputed territories without a comprehensive agreement, as it could deepen the country's diplomatic isolation, on the one hand, and accelerate demographic shifts, eventually turning a mono-Jewish state into a bi-national state with an Arab majority, on the other. It is also proposed to establish a state commission of inquiry into the failures of the war and the lessons learned from past Palestinian events, which would increase the transparency and accountability of the executive branch, as well as help restore public confidence and boost the morale of the national army.
The work on the National Security Doctrine, which has begun in Israel, demonstrates the recognition by the country's political and military leadership of the need to codify and modernize defense legislation against the backdrop of the ongoing armed conflict on the border with Gaza. The draft document prepared by the INSS may form the basis of Israel's long-term security strategy, taking into account the analysis of Israel's experience in waging the still unfinished war in the Middle East and other armed conflicts, including the special military operation in Ukraine. According to the authors' idea, the Doctrine will be designed to ensure the country's long-term security interests and consolidate the fundamental values that have been formulated since the establishment of the Israeli state. Meanwhile, if we follow the logic of the draft Doctrine, Israel does not seek to get rid of external influence, but builds its security strategy based on cooperation with its largest partner - the United States. Despite the country's attempts to strengthen its influence in regional processes in the Middle East, which the country's leadership has been declaring for the past several years, its position continues to be dependent and based on external security guarantees.
