Revision of the American transformation acts
Donald Trump began his new presidential term with a series of fundamental policy decrees affecting a wide range of areas, including trade, immigration, foreign aid, as well as issues of demographic diversity, civil rights, and federal hiring rules. Some of these executive orders are largely symbolic, others entail major structural and personnel changes, and some are already being challenged in the courts at the federal level. However, despite the fact that such “shock” decrees fully reflect the provisions of Trump's election campaign and are predominantly focused on restoring and strengthening U.S. domestic policy, they may not only change the balance of power on the world stage, but also cause destabilization in regions where the United States has traditionally played a key role. This is especially acute in the areas of humanitarian aid and military cooperation, where changes in the political vector of the state can complicate the fulfillment of international obligations and affect the global processes of security and economic development of countries.
Donald Trump's shock therapy
President-elect Donald Trump has begun his new term with a slew of executive orders related to both domestic political - economic and environmental - and foreign policy issues he outlined in his 2024 campaign. One such executive order placed a 90-day pause on all foreign aid for military, humanitarian and other programs pending a review of their “effectiveness and consistency” with the new administration's goals. Within three months, the heads of the relevant agencies must submit a report on their activities to the current U.S. Secretary of State and simultaneously acting director of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)* Marco Rubio, who, based on the results of the audit, will decide whether to continue, change or terminate the work of a particular program. If officials of these organizations are unable to provide the requested information, they may share the fate of USAID*, whose headquarters is currently closed and more than 1,600 employees, including those abroad, have been fired or are on administrative leave. All of this was the result of the refusal to allow employees of the Department of Government Effectiveness (DOGE), headed by Ilon Musk, access to confidential data. And despite the court's earlier temporary injunction against firing the company's employees, on February 21, 2025, U.S. District Judge Carl Nichols still allowed the Trump administration to proceed with USAID* staff reductions in the United States and around the world, denying their motion to extend the government's plan lockout.
Sticking to the slogan “Make America Great Again,” Trump's supporters are determined to optimize spending on aid to other countries, explaining this by economic inefficiency and ideological considerations. For example, the text of the decree confirms the fact that “the U.S. foreign aid bureaucracy and industry are not aligned with American interests and in many cases antithetical to American values.” According to Donald Trump, they destroy world stability by spreading ideas in other countries that directly contradict the maintenance of stable and harmonious relations both within states and in the international arena.
On the economic side, U.S. financial aid to date has been distributed primarily through various federal departments, including the Pentagon and the U.S. Department of Defense for military aid, and agencies such as USAID*, the State Department, and the Peace Corps for economic aid. According to the latest available financial reports, in 2023, USAID*, whose appropriations totaled more than $40 billion, allocated 40% of its budget to aid to Europe and Eurasia. A significant portion of these funds supported economic development in Ukraine ($14.6 billion), nearly double the 2022 total ($8.6 billion), and Ethiopia, Jordan, Yemen, and other states in the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa ($12.1 billion).
In terms of military assistance in 2023, the U.S. provided $8.2 billion aid to its allies around the world, almost half of which went to Egypt ($1.2 billion) and Israel ($3.8 billion) - the main importer of U.S. weapons for more than 50 years. Thus, since October 7, 2023, the U.S. has allocated at least $17.9 billion for Israel's security after the start of another military clash with Hamas. This amount consists of $3.8 billion in annual military aid to Israel under the Memorandum of Understanding signed in 2016, $8.7 billion allocated under the April 2024 supplemental appropriations act, and $5.4 billion allocated by the U.S. Department of Defense to restock the national reserve of weapons provided to Israel. In just one year, the Biden administration awarded more than 100 arms contracts to Tel Aviv, with the amounts of those deals falling below the threshold requiring congressional notification. And on August 13, 2024, the White House announced additional agreements with Israel for $20.3 billion in future arms transfers between 2026 and 2029.
In total, the United States' allocation to foreign countries is about 2% of the federal budget and 3.9% of the nation's discretionary budget. However, there are increases in spending in this sector in fiscal years 2022 and 2023 – 20% increase over 2021-2022 and 18% increase over the next period – primarily due to additional aid to Ukraine after the start of the special military operation. But despite the small percentage of total government spending, the current President of the United States has long opposed the allocation of significant sums for foreign aid, a position in which he has been supported by Congress, which controls the federal budget under the Constitution. That is why Marco Rubio's current goal is to bring all the work of the State Department and other subordinate organizations - from policy initiatives, programs, operations to personnel changes - in line with the “America First” foreign policy strategy, which prioritizes U.S. national interests.
However, the executive order issued by Donald Trump has its exceptions. For example, the President gave Marco Rubio the right to waive the 90-day pause on some programs that he believes should continue to be funded. The first to be unfrozen were funds - more than $4.1 billion - directed to programs overseen by the U.S. State Department's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, which manages arms sales and military aid to foreign countries - mainly Israel and Egypt, Washington's main allies in the Middle East. The rest of the funds have been used for Trump's immigration policies and efforts to combat illegal drug trafficking, and only a small portion for limited humanitarian aid. This harsh policy of the new administration has been received by the public in a strongly negative light, particularly in countries whose economic and humanitarian stability is directly linked to Washington's allocation of funds.
Response to Migration Changes
The temporary withdrawal of funding for humanitarian missions and the tightening of the US migration policy have caused a mixed position in Latin American countries whose economies are indirectly or directly dependent on Washington. In mid-January 2025, Honduran President Xiomara Castro said that if Donald Trump does not change his attitude to mass deportations, the country will be forced to reconsider its military cooperation with Washington. She said the U.S. has used Honduran territory for decades “without paying a cent,” and if Hondurans are deported en masse, “this presence will lose all meaning in Honduras.” At issue is the United States air base Soto Cano, which has been outside the capital since 1983 and has become a key U.S. entry point for humanitarian and anti-drug missions in Central America. Xiomara Castro also tried to call an emergency meeting within the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), hoping to rally countries in the region against Trump's mass deportation plan, but was rebuffed and ultimately decided to change her mind in favor of the United States. As a result, Honduras joined Panama and Costa Rica in agreeing to become a “middle ground” in Washington's ongoing program to deport foreign nationals illegally present in the US. And as early as February 2025, these countries received more than 600 deportees from Uzbekistan, China, Afghanistan and other states.
Another Latin American country that decided to go against the White House's new migrant policy was Colombia. On January 26, 2025, Colombian President Gustavo Petro refused to accept two flights carrying deportees from the United States in Bogota. In his social media posts, Petro cited Washington's mistreatment of the repatriates as they were sent on a U.S. military plane, handcuffed together. In response to these accusations, Trump threatened to impose strict trade tariffs, sanctions and visa restrictions against Colombian officials, to which Petro said he was ready to impose mirror tariffs against the US. Nevertheless, the diplomatic conflict was resolved after intense bilateral negotiations that forced the Colombian president to reverse his decision.
The attempt by the presidents of Colombia and Honduras to block the Trump administration's mass deportation plan underscores the more global challenge Latin American (LA) leaders face in adapting to a dramatic shift in U.S. immigration policy. Throughout President Biden's presidency, his administration pursued an “open borders” policy in which U.S. officials sought to partner with LA state governments and local NGOs to create safe migration routes and legalize their presence in the United States. This policy contributed to more than five million people, both authorized and unauthorized, entering the United States through the southern border between 2021 and 2023. Trump's return, however, marks the end of this era and the beginning of a new period of political tension.
Following the meeting between Joe Biden and Costa Rican President Rodrigo Chavez Robles in 2023, the U.S. State Department announced the countries' close cooperation and San Jose's increased role in the semiconductor supply chain under the CHIPS Act of 2022.
However, not all Latin American countries are opposed to the restrictions and changes that the United States has undergone since the beginning of 2025. For example, Costa Rica fully supports Trump's policy because the United States is San José's main trading partner and a source of large foreign investment. The country is heavily integrated into high-tech supply chains, especially in industries such as microelectronics and pharmaceuticals, where the United States plays a key role.
This alliance has become strategically accurate and beneficial for both sides, as it has allowed to stimulate Costa Rica's economic growth, ensure the economic security of the U.S. seeking to localize microelectronics production in the West, and gain a reliable ally ready to minimize cooperation with one of Washington's main competitors - China. Thus, in December 2024, San Jose excluded Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei from the 5G tender in Costa Rica, arguing that the company did not meet the criteria of a “reliable partner.” Later, the government filed a lawsuit against Huawei, accusing several company employees of fraudulent and corrupt operations involving two current and three former officials of the Costa Rican Electricity Institute (ICE).
The cybersecurity sector has been strategically important to San José since 2022, when a massive cyber attack occurred on about 30 Costa Rican government agencies, including the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Science, Innovation, Technology and Telecommunications (MCITI) and the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (CCSS). Following the event, the U.S. State Department announced $25 million to strengthen the country's cybersecurity and defense against potential attacks by malicious actors. The funds were intended to establish and equip a centralized Security Operations Center that would be responsible for monitoring, preventing, detecting, investigating, and responding to cyberattacks. Thus, with the help of this Center, on December 11, 2024, as part of a comprehensive cybersecurity audit of the country's critical infrastructure, conducted with U.S. experts, an intrusion into Costa Rica's telecommunications and technology systems by cybercriminal groups based in China was detected, raising tensions between the two countries.
Potential for increased U.S. military presence
However, cybersecurity is not the only concern of San Jose's leadership. Over time, more and more countries have shown unprecedented interest in Costa Rica, in part because of its favorable geographic location. As the first “transshipment point” for drug shipments from Latin America to the United States and Europe, Costa Rica's crime and corruption rates have skyrocketed recently. During the transit of drug trafficking, some of the product stays within the state, which over time forms an internal market and armed groups that have caused the homicide rate to reach 17.3 per 100,000 people in 2023 – double what it was a decade ago. In addition, the huge flow of migrants from South America – Venezuela, Nicaragua, Cuba, and Haiti – north to the U.S. border also passes through Costa Rican territory.
In 2023, Costa Rica has become a transit hub for an estimated 500,000 people, who have devastated resources and put a strain on the social safety net of a small country of just 5.2 million people.
To date, San José does not have sufficient resources and capabilities to resist external threats. For more than 70 years, Costa Rica has not had a standing army, and its functions are partially performed by the local police. Nevertheless, this only force in the country cannot fully ensure the security of citizens. Given the problems with transit and growing geopolitical tensions with the neighboring state of Nicaragua, Costa Ricans are increasingly considering the return of a regular army. Although Costa Rica's constitution explicitly prohibits the presence of foreign troops on its territory, San Jose authorities are relying in an emergency situation on operational support from the U.S., which has a joint task force of 500 troops at the Soto Cano base in Honduras.
The neighborhood with Nicaragua makes the absence of an army a very sensitive issue... Ultimately, we believe in the international rule of law to defend our territory in case of a military threat from any country
According to experts, the U.S. hopes that the Costa Rican government will revise the provisions regarding the country's military block. If San Jose rebuilds a regular army, Washington will have a new major importer of arms and military equipment, which will have a positive impact on the U.S. military-industrial complex. But also in case Costa Rica excludes from the Constitution the ban on the presence of foreign contingents on the territory of the country, the White House will have an additional factor to deter possible aggression from Nicaragua in Central America. In addition, the deployment of the U.S. military in Costa Rica will strengthen Washington's position in the region by increasing its influence on strategically important routes, including drug trafficking routes. It will also allow the U.S. to expand military cooperation and intelligence operations, providing greater control over security in Central America. At the same time, such changes could cause tensions with neighboring countries and lead to internal disputes within Costa Rica, which traditionally adheres to a policy of neutrality.
Thus, Donald Trump and his fundamental 2025 decrees have revealed sensitivities in the economy and political course of states, especially in regions dominated by developing countries in need of humanitarian or military assistance. Tough migration policies and cuts in foreign support have aggravated crises in countries dependent on Washington, provoking public discontent, increased crime and rising anti-migration sentiment. These measures have not only changed the balance of power in Latin America, Africa, and Asia, but have also forced many governments to rethink their foreign policy, seek new sources of funding, and strengthen regional alliances in the face of uncertainty.
